Abstract. Despite much work on sessions and session types in nonadversarial contexts, session-like behavior given an active adversary has not received an adequate definition and proof methods. We provide a syntactic property that guarantees that a protocol has session-respecting executions. Any uncompromised subset of the participants are still guaranteed that their interaction will respect sessions. A protocol transformation turns any protocol into a session-respecting protocol. We do this via a general theory of separability. Our main theorem applies to different separability requirements, and characterizes when we can separate protocol executions sufficiently to meet a particular requirement. This theorem also gives direct proofs of some old and new protocol composition results. Thus, our theory of separability appears to cover protocol composition and session-like behavior within a uniform framework, and gives a general pattern for reasoning about independence.
Introduction
A transaction or protocol respects sessions if the local runs of the individual participants always match up globally in a compatible way. When one participant receives any message in a session σ, it should have been sent by another participant acting within the same session σ. Session-respecting behavior is often studied using session types [21, 22] . However, most work in this tradition studies sessions within a benign execution environment.
We adapt those ideas to environments containing active adversaries, who may control the medium of communication [28, 15, 4] . We define session-respecting behavior in an adversarial environment, offering syntactic conditions that ensure a protocol's behavior respects sessions. We exhibit a transformation that, given any protocol, yields one with session-respecting behavior.
Our central idea is separability. In an execution, an adversary may receive a message from one session and deliver it, or its fragments, into another session. In this case, we would like to separate the sessions by removing the connection that the adversary has created. Separability means we can do this, possibly applying a renaming to one of them so that they involve different parameters. Although the adversary can create connections between different session, these connections are inessential. They can be removed modulo renaming. Hence, anything the adversary can achieve in a session, he can also do without relying on any other session. No successful attack requires unwitting support from participants engaged in a different session.
Session separability clarifies the real world effects of a protocol. Suppose a protocol allows a customer to buy merchandise through a broker, who receives a commission from a manufacturer. Can the broker manipulate the protocol so one interaction with the customer allows two interactions with the manufacturer? Can the broker receive his commission for the same transaction twice?
Suppose a compliant customer and manufacturer interact with a dishonest broker in a separable protocol. If messages from the single customer run reach local runs M 1 , M 2 for the manufacturer, they will belong to the same session. Alternatively one run M belongs to no session, i.e. it occurs with no involvement of a customer. These conditions are easy for a protocol designer to analyze. To protect against the first, the manufacturer should contribute a fresh random value ("nonce") to help define the session. Then distinct manufacturer runs always belong to different sessions. To protect against the second, some authentication is needed between manufacturer and customer, a familiar and well-understood problem. Thus, separability reduces the no-double-commission property to simple characteristics of the protocol.
Strand spaces offer a partially ordered model; protocol executions ("bundles") are annotated directed acyclic graphs [30, 20, 18] . The edges represent causal relations. We interpret separation properties in terms of the absence of causal paths in these graphs, or the ability to find a related graph without them.
Contributions. Our main result, the Separability Theorem (Thm. 18), tells how to take an execution of a protocol and modify it into another execution that satisfies separability. It applies to a range of different separability specifications. Each separability specification is a partial order that says which kinds of events are allowed to causally affect which others.
Our result about sessions, Thm. 19, says that the syntactic conditions in Def. 8-mainly concerning "session nonces" that serve to define sessions-entail the premise of Thm. 18. Thus, executions can be made to satisfy a separability specification defined in terms of these nonces. We also provide a transformation that strengthens any protocol to one that satisfies these conditions (Thm. 10).
Thm. 18 also applies to other separability specifications. We apply it to protocols with "disjoint encryption" in three slightly different senses (Thms. [21] [22] [23] [24] , thereby yielding variants, sometimes sharpenings, of a number of results on preserving security goals under protocol composition [19, 1, 9, 8, 11] . Thus, the Separability Theorem formalizes a pattern of reasoning with wide applicability in protocol design and analysis. It unites session-oriented reasoning with protocol composition.
Related work. Various flavors of sessions and separability have already played roles within protocol analysis and design. Among approaches based on computa-tional methods, a session notion is often used to define the local runs that authentication should connect, as with Bellare and Rogaway [4] ; in some models the sessions are defined by a bitstring that may be chosen by the adversary or built out of random contributions from the participants (e.g. Canetti-Krawczyk [7] ). The Universal Composability model also assumes a random value that contributes to each cryptographically prepared unit and acts as a session identifier [6] ; for a recent and more flexible alternative, see Küsters and Tuengerthal [24] .
If different sessions of a protocol can never affect one another, then this simplifies analysis. The designer can explore the outcomes possible with a single instance of each role in the protocol. Indeed, Lowe's original proof that his changes to Needham-Schroeder were correct used a separability argument. He proved that any run could involve at most two non-separable instances of either role, and then model-checked the possible two-instance runs [25] . Lowe and Allaa Kamil [23] use separability to establish properties of TLS, such as that the adversary cannot divert application data from one TLS session to another. Their path-based methods within the strand space framework motivated some of the techniques used below in §4.
Cortier et al. [10] propose a protocol transformation, which they prove correct using session separability. Given a protocol satisfying any security property in an environment with a passive adversary, their transformation returns a new protocol that satisfies that property despite an active adversary. Their transformation adds freshly-generated nonces to the original protocol; this suggested our treatment of nonces in Thm. 10. Their transformation then inserts all of these nonces in with each message of the original protocol, which is signed and then encrypted. Our transformation does not add any additional cryptographic operations, but simply inserts the nonces into any pre-existing cryptographic units. This simpler treatment suffices because we are here exclusively concerned with separability, rather than any particular security goals. Another contrast concerns the adversary model. Their result concerns only sessions in which every participant is compliant, whereas our separability holds for the compliant participants, even in sessions with non-compliant participants.
Arapinis, Delaune, and Kremer [2] also offer a separability argument, leading to a protocol transformation which guarantees secrecy. The transformation adds nonces to each encrypted or signed term, although, together with nonces, it also adds principal names. Only the former is needed for separability; the latter helps with secrecy. Their transformation appears to generalize Lowe's fix to Needham-Schroeder. A subsequent paper with Ryan [12] investigates tagged password-based protocols, where the "tags" are tuples of session parameters hashed in with the key. They show that their composition is resistant to guessing attacks. Their proofs appear to establish particular instances of our Separability Theorem. We conjecture that our methods reconstruct their results, although proving this would require reformulating behavioral equivalences (in addition to trace properties) within our framework.
Deniélou et al. in [5] provide a compiler for generating ML code from multiparty protocol specifications. Their main result (Session Integrity Theorem)
shows that there is no interference between multiple instances of the same protocol. Such a result could also be modeled in our framework as a variant of protocol independence. As we have mentioned, our approach also seems to capture the essence of several protocol composition results [19, 1, 9, 8, 11] .
Separability also allows full verification within the bounded-session model of protocol analysis [29, 26, 3] , rendering many classes of problems decidable.
In [17] we offer a logical language that can formalize the security goals that are preserved when omitting separable local runs.
Strand Spaces, with a Session Protocol
We first summarize the strand space terminology we will use in this paper. See [30, 18] for more detail on strand spaces and our terminology.
We also introduce an example to illustrate separability, the Trusted Broker Service, in which a server S acts as a broker to match clients C 1 and C 2 , who are executing different roles. S provides them with a key K to use to initiate an exchange. Clients trust the broker to generate a fresh key; to distribute it only to compliant principals; and to choose an appropriate pairing of clients.
Messages. Let Alg 0 be an algebra equipped with some operators and a set of homomorphisms η : Alg 0 → Alg 0 . We call the members of Alg 0 basic values.
Alg 0 is the disjoint union of infinite sets of nonces, basic keys, names, and texts. The operators sk(a) and pk(a) maps names to signature keys and public encryption keys. K −1 maps an asymmetric basic key to its inverse, and a symmetric basic key to itself. Homomorphisms η are maps that that respect sorts and the operators sk(a), pk(a), and K −1 . An infinite set X disjoint from Alg 0 -the indeterminates-act like unsorted variables.
The algebra Alg of messages is freely generated from Alg 0 ∪ X by two operations: encryption {|t 0 |} t1 and tagged concatenation tag t 0 , t 1 . The tags tag are drawn from some set TAG. For a distinguished tag nil, we write nil t 0 , t 1 as t 0 , t 1 . In {|t 0 |} t1 , a non-basic key t 1 is a symmetric key. To reduce cases in proofs, we do not introduce digital signature and hashing as separate operations. We can encode hashes hash(t) as encrypting t with a public key K h , where no principal holds the inverse decryption key K
A homomorphism α = (η, χ) : Alg → Alg pairs a homomorphism η on basic values and a function χ : X → Alg; α(t) is defined by the conditions:
We call these homomorphisms substitutions, and use them to plug in values for parameters. Indeterminates x are blank slots, to be filled by any χ(x) ∈ Alg. Messages t 1 , t 2 have a common instance when there exist substitutions α, β that identify them: α(t 1 ) = β(t 2 ). Alg has the most general unifier property. That is, suppose that for v, w ∈ Alg, there exist any α, β such that α(v) = β(w). Then there are α 0 , β 0 , such that α 0 (v) = β 0 (w), and for all α 1 , β 1 , if α 1 (v) = β 1 (w), then α 1 and β 1 are of the forms γ • α 0 and γ • β 0 .
Strands, Ingredients, and Origination. A strand is a sequence of local actions called nodes, each of which is either a message transmission, written • →, or else a message reception, written • ←. Strands may be written vertically, or horizontally as in Fig. 1 . This figure shows the behaviors of an initiating client C 1 and a responding client C 2 with a broker or server S. The protocol, which we call tbs, allows the broker to pair requests from suitable pairs of clients, and distribute a session key to them.
If n is a node, and the message t is transmitted or received, then we write t = msg(n). Double arrows indicate successive events on the same strand, e.g.
• ⇒ • ⇒ •. Each role in Fig. 1 , and each local run in Figs. 5, 3, is a strand.
We write s ↓ i to mean the i th node along s, starting at s ↓ 1. The parameters of s are the basic values and indeterminates in any msg(s ↓ i).
The ingredients of a message are those subterms that may be reached by descending through concatenations, and through the plaintext but not the encryption keys. The values that occur in it descend also through encryptions. We write ("is an ingredient of") and ("occurs in"), resp., for the smallest reflexive, transitive relation such that
We say that t originates on a node n if n is a transmission node, and t msg(n), and for all n 0 , if n 0 ⇒ + n, then t msg(n). A basic value a is freshly chosen if it originates just once. We call it uniquely originating. In this case, a was chosen by a participant, without the bad luck of any other principal selecting the same value independently. A key is regarded as uncompromised if it originates nowhere. We call a basic value a non-originating in B if there exists no node n ∈ B such that a originates at n. It may still be used in B even if it does not originate anywhere, since the regular strands may receive and send messages encrypted by K or K −1 , thus using K for encryption and decryption, resp. A message t 0 lies only inside encryptions in t with keys S iff, in t's abstract syntax tree, every path from the root to an occurrence of t 0 traverses an encryption, and if that occurrence is in the plaintext, then the key is in S.
Protocols.
A protocol Π is a finite set of strands, called the roles of the protocol. A regular strand for Π is any instance of one of the roles of Π, i.e. the result α(ρ) of some substitution α on the parameters of a role ρ ∈ Π. Fig. 1 is an example protocol. A protocol may also specify some parameters of a role that are always non-originating or uniquely originating. We will also formalize adversary behavior by strands (which use inverse). We stipulate a syntactic constraint: Assumption 1 If ρ ∈ Π, then the key inverse symbol does not appear in any message msg(ρ ↓ i). Moreover, sk(A) msg(ρ ↓ i). If {|t|} K msg(ρ ↓ i) for ρ ∈ Π, then K is either a basic value or an encryption (not a concatenation).
tag t1 , t2 The Adversary. Adversary strands consist of zero or more reception nodes followed by one transmission node. The adversary obtains the transmitted value as a function of the values received; or creates it, if there are no reception nodes. The adversary can choose basic values, and operate on complex values using the strands shown above in Fig. 2 . These are often used in patterns, e.g. as in Fig. 2 Part II, which transport information along paths. Six strands are shown. Two are of length 1, in which the adversary transmits keys, namely his own private decryption key pk(C) −1 and B's public encryption key pk(B). Two are a (leftmost) decryption strand and a (rightmost) encryption strand. The second node on a decryption or encryption strand is called the key node, since it receives the key used to perform the cryptographic operation.
In the middle are a separation strand that breaks A , N a into its two parts, followed by a concatenation strand that puts them back together. These strands are unnecessary here. We include them here to illustrate that the adversary can always break a concatenation down to non-concatenated parts, i.e., either basic values or encryptions (see Assumption 3).
Adversary strands are closed under substitutions along the strand, as they comprise all the instances of the roles in Fig. 2 , Part I. Indeed, this also holds for regular strands, which are all the substitution instances of the roles ρ ∈ Π: Lemma 1. If α is a substitution and s is an adversary strand or a regular strand of Π, then so is α(s).
Bundles. An execution is pieced together from a finite set of strands (or their initial segments), where these may be regular strands of Π or adversary strands from §4. Two nodes are connected with a single arrow • → • when the former transmits a message, and the latter receives that same message directly from it. A bundle is a causally well founded graph built using strands by →: Definition 2. Let B = N , → E ∪ ⇒ E be a finite, directed acyclic graph where (i) n 1 ⇒ E n 2 implies n 1 ⇒ n 2 , i.e. that n 1 , n 2 are successive nodes on the same strand; and (ii) n 1 → E n 2 implies that n 1 is a transmission node, n 2 is a reception node, and msg(n 1 ) = msg(n 2 ). B is a bundle if:
1. If n 1 ⇒ n 2 , and n 2 ∈ N , then n 1 ∈ N and n 1 ⇒ E n 2 ; and 2. If n 2 is a reception node, there exists a unique n 1 ∈ N such that n 1 → E n 2 .
B is an open bundle if, in condition 2, there is at most one n 1 ∈ N such that n 1 → E n 2 , rather than exactly one.
We write nodes(B) for the nodes of B, and regnodes(B) for its regular (nonadversary) nodes; edges(B) is the set ⇒ E ∪ → E of edges of B. B is the causal partial order (→ E ∪ ⇒ E ) * , and ≺ B = (→ E ∪ ⇒ E ) + . A node n is realized in an open bundle B iff n is a transmission node, or else n is a reception node and has an incoming → edge, i.e. n → n.
(B, unique, non) is an annotated bundle (resp. open bundle) if B is a bundle (resp. open bundle), unique is a finite set of basic values each originating at most once in B, and non is a finite set of basic values each originating nowhere in B.
The causal partial order is well-founded, since B is finite. Fig. 3 is a bundle. tbs defines a session via a nonce from each client, and the server-generated session key. It gathers the two incoming messages to the broker in a single reception, allowing some (untrusted) auxiliary process to propose a matching. In Fig. 3 , the adversary reuses the nonces N 1 , N 2 to start a second server strand. However, we can fix this, separating the second server strand, just by renaming these nonces to new values N 1 , N 2 . This yields the new bundle in Fig. 4 , in which the adversary can supply the message coming from the upper right. Fig. 4 is an open bundle, as shown without adversary activity. 
In studying separability we are interested in bundles equipped with a choice of fresh and uncompromised values. Hence, we will assume that all bundles are annotated with sets of uniquely originating and non-originating values unique, non. When using "bundle" and B, we will mean "annotated bundle" as defined above.
The core pattern for separating a session is:
-removing dependence on an existing session; -renaming some freshly chosen items in one or more local runs; -allowing the adversary to supply incoming messages in these runs.
When a protocol ensures that this pattern will succeed in separating behaviors, it has session behavior. However, this is not always possible. As an example, consider the protocol tbsMinus, which is just like tbs, except that the session nonces N 1 , N 2 are omitted in all the messages. Here we can have the essentially inseparable bundle Fig. 5 . No amount of renaming and pruning edges will produce a bundle in which C 2 and C 2 do not both depend on the same strand C 1 .
We assume (i) public encryption keys may be freely sent or used by anyone, including the adversary; and (ii) when a value a originates uniquely, and is used on a different regular strand as part of a key for encryption, then it has been received as an ingredient on that strand. When a msg(m 1 ), this conclusion follows from the definition of unique origination. We also assume (iii) that a basic value is not received from a later transmission when it could be received from an earlier one. If a bundle violates this property, we can fix it by rerouting arrows to start from earlier nodes.
Assumption 2 Let (B, unique, non) be an annotated bundle.
An inseparable execution of tbsMinus 1. pk(A) ∈ unique ∪ non for all names A. 2. Suppose a ∈ unique, a originates on n 0 , and for some transmission node m 1 , a K and {|t|} K originates at m 1 . If n 0 , m 1 lie on different strands, then there is a reception node m 0 ⇒ + m 1 such that a msg(m 0 ).
is a basic value, where n 0 , n 1 are transmission nodes, with n 0 n 1 n 2 . Then it is not the case that n 1 → n 2 .
Lemma 3. Suppose B is a bundle with n 0 , m 1 ∈ nodes(B). If a ∈ unique originates at n 0 and a msg(m 1 ), then n 0 m 1 .
Proof. If there are any counterexamples m 1 , choose m to be -minimal among them. By clause 2 in the definition of bundle, m is not a reception node. If a msg(m 1 ), then m is a point of origination, so by uniqueness m = n 0 . Otherwise, Assumption 2, clause 2 contradicts the minimality of m.
The "Lies-below" relation. We now define a relation between bundles (or open bundles) of reducing information. We say that one (open) bundle lies below another when the latter results by adding information to the ordering relation and adding equations between parameters. The key idea is reducing the ordering relation in a bundle B, possibly renaming some occurrences of parameters, so as to "rename them apart" in a simpler bundle C. We actually formalize this in the other direction, by considering a homomorphism α from C into the richer B. We call this a local renaming, because restricted to portions of C it acts like a renaming. It acts injectively on each portion separately.
Definition 4 (Local Renaming). Suppose C is an open bundle.
The sets S 1 , . . . , S n partition nodes(C) by strands if (i) the S i are disjoint; (ii) S i = nodes(C); and (iii) any two nodes on the same strand are in the same partition class S i .
A substitution α is a local renaming of C with respect to S 1 , . . . , S n if the sets partition nodes(C) by strands, and moreover, for every j ≤ n, α restricted to the parameters of the strands in S j is a renaming, i.e. an invertible map from parameters to parameters.
For instance, in Fig. 4 , the part to the left of the white space S 1 and the part to the right S 2 form a partition by strands. The map which sends N 1 → N 1 and N 2 → N 2 , and is elsewhere the identity, is a local renaming, which we will
It is a renaming (the identity) when restricted to the parameters that appear in S 1 , the left half, since N 1 , N 2 do not appear on the left. Moreover, it is a renaming when restricted to S 2 , the right half, too, since N 1 , N 2 do not appear as parameters on the right. Thus, it is injective on the parameters appearing in S 2 .
Every renaming is a local renaming, but a local renaming α is not a true ("global") renaming when α(x) = α(y) holds for parameters x, y to nodes in different partition classes S j , S k . We often think of the action of a local renaming backward, viewing its source as the result of "renaming apart" values that are equated in its target. One open bundle lies below another if, after applying a local renaming forward, their regular nodes are the same, as are their uniquely originating and non-originating values, but one precedence order is a suborder of the other: Definition 5. 1. C lies below B via α iff, for some S 1 , . . . , S i , α is a local renaming for C with respect to S 1 , . . . , S i , and:
2. C lies below B if it does so via some α. 3. B and C are equivalent iff each lies below the other via renamings α, β, and α • β is the identity on the parameters involved. 
, given the choices of unique, non mentioned after Defn. 2. If C lies below B, then C differs from B only in having a sparser ordering, and in not yet having equated some parameters that have been equated in B. We can think of C as a simplified version of B. It is less informative in that the information that these parameters are equal has not yet been added. Lemma 6. "Lies below" is a well-founded partial order to within isomorphism:
1. "Lies below" is reflexive and transitive. 2. C and B each lie below the other iff their regular parts are isomorphic. 3. If B i i is an infinite sequence of bundles such that i < j implies B j lies below B i , then for some i, k, i < k and B i lies below B k .
Formalizing Sessions
We now turn to defining when tbs and similar session-oriented protocols are separable. Suppose that Π is a protocol, and P : Π → Nonce ∪ Key is a function that chooses a parameter for each role. As an example, if Π is tbs, we would be interested in the function P that assigns N 1 to the first client role; N 2 to the second client role; and K to the server (broker) role. We say that x is a session parameter if x ∈ range(P ). P associates each role to the session parameter that it chooses. We call P (ρ) ρ's proper session parameter, and we require that P (ρ) originates on ρ.
If
As a convention, we will assume that the parameters of each role have been chosen (by a renaming if necessary) so that corresponding session parameters on different roles have the same name. We could of course avoid this convention at the cost of added notation, in the form of a function which would supply the necessary correlations.
No Ambiguity. tbs uses the session parameters unambiguously in each encryption. No encryption in the protocol could be misinterpreted by a receiver so as to interchange the session parameters. For instance, N 1 and N 2 always appear in the same order, and K always appears after them or in key position.
No ambiguity: If encryptions {|t|} K msg(ρ ↓ i) and {|t |} K msg(σ ↓ j) have a common instance α({|t|} K ) = β({|t |} K ), then ρ and σ have acquired the same session parameters by steps i and j resp., and α(x) = β(x) for each of those session parameters.
We here follow our convention that corresponding session parameters on different roles have been given the same parameters names.
Contribution. Every encrypted unit involves the session parameters. This is akin to the tagging property [12] , except that the session parameters do not have to contribute to the key. The last message of tbs is {|Hello, C 1 , N 1 , N 2 |} K . Two session parameters are in the plaintext, while K is the encryption key. All the session parameters could be concentrated in the key; {|Hello, C 1 |} hash(N1,N2,K) would also work. Alternatively, they could all be concentrated in the plaintext, with some public key used for encryption.
In this protocol, the participants agree on all of the session parameters at the start. They then use them throughout the remainder of the protocol. A protocol can also have some participants agree on their session parameters, while other participants join the session later. These "late arrivals" allow for an attractive flexibility in the session-type literature [13] . Of course, the encrypted units before the late arrivals are expected to contain only the session parameters that have already been seen at that point.
Contribution to encryptions:
If {|t|} K msg(ρ ↓ i) and session parameter x is acquired by step i, then x {|t|} K .
The No-V s property. The observation that session parameters may be acquired piecemeal is an important insight. It implies that "same session," which sounds like an equivalence relation, is in fact misleading. A partially defined session with session parameters x 1 , . . . , x i may affect any of its possible extensions with an additional session parameter x 1 , . . . , x i , x i+1 . However, any one of those extensions is incompatible with those having a different value x i+1 . Indeed, messages from a step with extended session parameters x 1 , . . . , x i , x i+1 should not affect an event with session parameters x 1 , . . . , x i . If they did, the latter could also affect a distinct extension x 1 , . . . , x i , x i+1 . Thus, transitively, there could be effects from an event with parameters x 1 , . . . , x i , x i+1 to one with parameters x 1 , . . . , x i , x i+1 . That would be contrary to the session discipline. For this reason, we regard the "may influence" relation on partially defined sessions as a partial order (on the sessions) or as a pre-order (on the transmission and reception events within the sessions). We will write n 1 ; n 2 when an event n 1 may influence an event n 2 .
We require non-influence to persist, specifically when n 1 selects a fresh value that is a parameter to n 2 . We formulate this as a "no V s" condition. Whenever we have a V in the may-influence relation, this is not an open V , but a closed triangle-like configuration, for any n 3 n 2 : A node n 2 that I cannot influence cannot influence a later node that I can influence, at least when I have uniquely originated a value found in that node. This no V s property turns out to be crucial to proving the Separability Theorem, whose proof tries to create new bundles by local renamings.
To see what could go wrong, suppose the tbs server received the two parts of its first incoming message on separate nodes: (c11, C 1 , N 1 ) ⇒ (c21, C 2 , N 2 ) ⇒ . . .. Then an adversary could deliver C 2 's nonce N 2 as if it were from C 1 , on the first server node n 1 . C 2 's first node n 1 should not influence n 2 , since n 1 has the C 2 nonce defined, whereas n 2 does not; n 2 has only the C 1 nonce parameter defined. However, if the adversary re-delivers the same nonce on the server's second node n 3 , then C 2 's first node n 1 can influence this second server node n 3 . Node n 3 has the same value for the only session parameter defined on n 1 . This is precisely the open V situation, where n 1 ; n 2 ; n 3 , and n 1 ; n 3 .
Acquisition. In order to ensure the no-V s property syntactically, some properties are needed, constraining how session parameters are acquired. First, some session parameters x are received in a principal's first reception. These may be transported without encryption, such as N 1 and N 2 in tbs. This is why S receives both N 1 and N 2 in a single message in its first node. Second, there are no transmissions after a reception and before transmitting a strand's proper session nonce. Third, when a session includes late-arriving participants, values freshly chosen after a late arrival in the session will be transmitted under encryptions that cannot be compromised. Various techniques are available for proving this [20, 18] , but here we will just use a simple sufficient condition, namely that the decryption key is non-originating. These messages will be received by participants that have already joined the session; i.e. their proper nonces have already been chosen, and must also appear in this encryption by the Contribution requirement. This is a per-bundle requirement, for a bundle B.
Parameter acquisition: Session parameters divide into two groups, x and y.
1. If x in x is acquired on reception node ρ ↓ i, then i is the earliest reception node on ρ. 2. If x in x is acquired on transmission node ρ ↓ i, and ρ ↓ k is any reception node with k < i, then there is no transmission node between them. 3. Let y in y be acquired (by reception or transmission) on ρ ↓ i, and let k ≥ i. There is a set LAK(B) of late-arrival protection keys of B such that: (a) If α(ρ ↓ k) ∈ nodes(B), then α(y) lies only inside encryptions in msg(α(ρ ↓ k)) with keys K where α(K −1 ) ∈ LAK(B). (b) If a ∈ unique B is any value acquired on α(ρ ↓ k), α(y) lies only inside encryptions in msg(α(ρ ↓ k)) with keys K where α(K −1 ) ∈ LAK(B).
Condition 3 ensures that y always appears together with all previously defined session parameters. We focus on bundles in which, for any late arrivals to the session in a bundle B, the strands still active then are all uncompromised, i.e. LAK(B) ⊆ non B . In tbs, all session parameters belong to the first group x, as all of the roles acquire them from their peers on their first reception. For protocol design, it is desirable that the session key can double as S's session parameter, traveling in the encrypted messages from the server.
May-influence relations. Curiously, Thm. 18 depended only on two properties of a reflexive, transitive may-influence relation, namely, the no V s property, and the fact that forward influence on a strand is always permitted. Because of this generality, we sought to specify various degrees of separability, i.e. to specify how sparse a bundle we would like to obtain in the "lies below" ordering. To parametrize our reasoning, we define a may-influence relation to be a preordering n 1 ; n 2 on regular nodes with these two properties. It specifies the upper bound on the set of Π nodes allowed to influence other Π nodes.
Definition 7. Let B be an (annotated) bundle for protocol Π. Then a preorder ; is a may-influence relation for B iff for all n 1 , n 2 , n 3 ∈ regnodes(B),
1. if n 1 ⇒ n 2 then n 1 ; n 2 ; and 2. "No Vs," Eqn. 1: Suppose (i) a ∈ unique B originates at n 1 and a msg(n 2 ) and (ii) n 2 ; n 3 and n 2 B n 3 . If n 1 ; n 3 , then n 1 ; n 2 . B obeys ; iff, for all m, n ∈ regnodes(B), m B n implies m ; n. Π obeys ; subject to Φ if, for every Π-bundle B satisfying Φ, there is a Π-bundle C satisfying Φ such that C lies below B and C obeys ;.
When m ; n, we say that m is permitted to influence n.
When m ⇒ n, m must be allowed to influence n, since it is impossible to prevent the influence; hence condition 1 on influence functions. Condition 2 prohibits open, V-shaped configurations. One leg of the V starts at a's origin n 1 , and the other at n 2 , and the legs join at a jointly influenced n 3 . When a msg(n 2 ), then n 1 must be permitted to influence n 2 . If a's origin n 1 cannot influence n 2 , then their causal consequences must remain separated thereafter.
Π obeys ; if Π-bundles either already obey the ordering constraint, or some bundle lying below is sparse enough to obey it. In weakening the order , we are allowed to select preimages under local renamings. We use the constraints Φ to record assumptions about freshly chosen nonces and uncompromised keys.
Protocols with session parameters. We can now define: Definition 8. A bundle B satisfies Φ s , the session constraint, if the late arrival protection keys LAK(B) ⊆ non B and, for every node α(ρ ↓ i) ∈ nodes(B), where ρ acquires its proper session nonce at step i, α(P (ρ)) ∈ unique B .
Π has session parameters P for B if No ambiguity, Contribution to encryptions, and Parameter acquisition hold for Π, P , and B.
The session may-influence relation ; s holds between Π-nodes n 1 and n 2 , written n 1 ; s n 2 , iff (i) n 1 = α(ρ ↓ i) and n 2 = β(σ ↓ j) where ρ, σ ∈ Π; (ii) every session parameter x that has been acquired by step i on ρ has been acquired by step j on σ; and (iii) α(x) = β(x) for each session parameter x acquired by step i on ρ.
Essentially, n 1 ; s n 2 means that the partial function assigning session parameters to values in node n 1 is a subfunction of the partial function assigning session parameters to values in node n 2 . The may-influence relation is fixed by the ordering of definedness on these partial functions.
Lemma 9.
If B is a Π-bundle satisfying Φ s , and Π has session parameters P in B, then ; s is a may-influence relation for B.
Proof. Condition 1, that ; s is preserved by ⇒, is immediate from the fact that session parameters are unchanged once defined.
For the no-V s property 2, suppose that a originates uniquely on n 1 = α(ρ ↓ i), and is received on n 2 = β(σ ↓ j). Suppose first that i is before any y parameter originates or is acquired. By the Parameter acquisition condition 1, all of the x parameters except possibly P (σ) are determined on n 2 . If n 1 ; s n 2 , then either n 2 disagrees with n 1 on a session parameter, or n 2 has not yet acquired a x acquired on n 1 .
If the former, this disagreement persists to any n 3 n 2 such that n 2 ; s n 3 . If the latter, it can only be P (σ). Since B satisfies Φ s , when the strand of n 2 acquires a value for its proper session parameter, it will be uniquely originating, hence distinct from the value previously defined on n 1 . Moreover, by Parameter acquisition condition 2, P (σ) is chosen by the time of the next transmission after n 2 . Hence, any subsequent node that n 2 can influence has a value for P (σ) incompatible with n 1 's.
Finally, suppose that i is at or after the acquisition of some late-arriving y session parameter. Then a is transmitted inside a safe encryption, and any regular strand that receives it must retransmit it safely. Hence, a is accompanied by all session parameters in force at that point, inside the same encrypted unit (Contribution to encryptions). Moreover, any recipient must agree on the values of those parameters, by No ambiguity. Thus n 1 ; s n 2 , which implies No-V s.
A transformation yielding protocols with session parameters. Theorem 20 suggests a transformation to produce protocols with session parameters.
The transformation has two parts. The first part prepends before σ a node that transmits a session parameter, and a node that receives a concatenated tuple containing session nonces from each of the other roles:
In the second part, we transform all encrypted units {|t|} K contained in σ, to {|t ,Ñ |} K , whereÑ is the sequence of all the session nonces introduced in the first step. Thus, letting TÑ be this transformation, It is easy to very that No Ambiguity, Contribution to Encryptions, and Parameter Acquisition are all true, where the late-arriving parameters y are vacuous.
The Separability Theorem
Penetrator paths. The ways that adversary strands manipulate messages are tightly constrained by their syntactic forms. We introduce penetrator paths to be able to express these relations conveniently.
Definition 11.
A key node is the middle node on an adversary encryption or decryption strand, which receives the key to be used (Fig. 2) .
A penetrator path in B is a sequence p = n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n k with k > 0 and each n i ∈ nodes(B), such that:
1. n 1 , . . . , n k−1 are all penetrator nodes; 2. if n i is a reception node and i < k, then n i+1 is a transmission node and n i ⇒ + n i+1 ; 3. if n i is a transmission node, then n i → n i+1 in B.
We often focus on the penetrator paths that stretch from a regular node to a regular node, traversing penetrator strands. These represent activities of the adversary that extract useful materials from regular transmissions, and use them to construct messages to satisfy regular receptions.
We write p(i) for the node n i , and |p| for k, the number of arrows traversed by p, so p(|p|) is the last node on p. Two paths are shown in Fig. 2 . In both cases, p(0) is the hollow circle at the upper left, indicating an unshown regular node, and p(9) is the hollow circle at lower right. One path traverses the edge A in the middle, and the other traverses N a . We generally write first(p) and last(p) for p(0) and p(|p|).
Definition 12.
The penetrator path p is direct if no key node appears in p, except possibly as last(p).
B is normal if, on every direct penetrator path, each destructive penetrator strand (decryption, separation) appears before any constructive strand (encryption, concatenation).
The penetrator paths in Fig. 2 are direct. We speak of an extended path when we wish to emphasize that it may not be direct.
Lemma 13 ([20]).
1. msg(p(i)) msg(first(p)) and msg(p(k)) msg(last(p)); 2. If p(i) is an adversary node, then p(i) lies on a destructive strand (decryption, separation); and 3. If p(k + 1) is an adversary node, then p(k + 1) lies on a constructive strand (encryption, concatenation).
This lemma still holds in our current context, which includes compound keys, because it is restricted to direct paths p. Since a key node in p must be the last node, and we never continue along its encryption or decryption strand, we never encounter any case different from those already shown in the proof in [20] . By this lemma, when proving that there exists a bundle lying below B with a particular property, it is sound to silently assume that B is normal.
The bridge term of a direct penetrator path p in a normal B is the message msg(p(j)) on the edge that follows all destructive penetrator strands and precedes all constructive penetrator strands. We will write bt(p) to refer to the bridge term of p. A single communication edge first(p) → p(1), with no adversary strands in between, is a direct path of length 1; bt(p) = msg(first(p)) = msg(p(1)). The two edges leading to n 1 and n 2 in Fig. 3 are examples with the concatenated bridge terms c11, N 1 , C 1 and c21, N 2 , C 2 . The bridge terms for the two direct paths shown in Fig. 2 are A and N a . The adversary can always break concatenations down in this way:
is a bridge in bundle B, then msg(p(i)) is either an encryption or a basic value, but not a concatenation.
For any bundle C, there is an equivalent B in which the adversary separates every concatenated value to its basic or encrypted parts, and then subsequently reconcatenates these parts, as in Fig. 2 , Part II [20, Prop. 9] . Assumption 3 restricts our attention to these equivalent but more convenient B.
The direct paths form a framework that supports the extended paths:
Lemma 14. Let B be a bundle, and p an extended penetrator path in B that is not direct. Let p(i) be the earliest key node along p.
1. The part of p leading to p(i) forms a direct path.
2. Let p(j) be any key node along p, lying on an encryption or decryption strand s, m 1 ⇒ p(j) ⇒ m 3 . There are direct paths q such that m 1 , m 3 lie on q. 3. If s is an encryption strand, then msg(p(j)) msg(last(q)). If s is a decryption strand, then msg(p(j)) msg(first(q)).
Proof. Claim 1 holds by the definition. Clause 2 is by induction on the -initial subgraphs of B. Clause 3 follows by Lemma 13.
We end our discussion of extended penetrator paths with a few key lemmas. The first says that a uniquely originating value that reaches a part of an execution must be transported there by a direct path. The second (an immediate consequence of Lemma 13) says that the adversary gains access to a basic value a along every direct path between endpoints that share no encryptions. This is important to us, because it means that the adversary can substitute a new value a for a, causing a renaming at the end of the direct path, if nothing goes wrong later in the renamed bundle.
Lemma 15. Let B be normal, and let S 1 , S 2 partition B by strands. If a originates uniquely on n 1 ∈ S 1 and a msg(n 2 ), where n 2 ∈ S 2 , then there is a direct path p crossing from S 1 to S 2 such that n 1 first(p), last(p) n 2 , and a bt(p).
Proof. First assume that a msg(n 2 ).
Let M = {m ∈ S 2 : a msg(m) and m n 2 }. M is non-empty, so M has -minimal members; let m 0 be one of them. If m 0 is a transmission node, then a originates there, contrary to the assumption that it originates uniquely in S 1 . So m 0 is a reception node. Let P = {p : last(p) = m 0 }. Suppose a bt(p) for some p ∈ P . By the minimality of m 0 , first(p) ∈ S 2 , so p is the desired path.
If, however, a bt(p) for all p ∈ P , then there must be an adversary node • a → originating a, contradicting unique origination on n 1 .
Finally, if a msg(n 2 ), but a msg(n 2 ), use Assumption 2 to obtain an earlier node n 2 ⇒ n 2 in which it is an ingredient, and apply the preceding.
Lemma 16. Let B be a normal bundle, and let p be an extended path in B. If p(j) → p(j + 1) is the last bridge along p, msg(p(j)) msg(last(p)).
Proof. If p(j), . . . , last(p) lies on a single direct penetrator path, then msg(p(j)) msg(last(p)) by Lemma 13, whence msg(p(j)) msg(last(p)). So suppose that the last bridge lies on an extended path that ends at a key node p(k). Since there is no subsequent bridge, by the definition of normal bundle, this key node cannot lie on a destructive decryption strand; it must lie on a constructive encryption strand. Thus, msg(p(j)) msg(p(k)) and msg(p(k)) is the key of msg(p(k + 1)) = {|t|} msg(p(k)) . Since the remainder of p is constructive, msg(p(k + 1)) msg(last(p)).
The Separability Theorem. An extended path p is critical iff its source first(p) is not permitted to influence its target last(p). We wish to remove the critical paths, since this will reduce a bundle to one that obeys the influence specification. If the adversary uses a path to influence a node, contrary to our ;, we want to clip this path. If we can always remove these paths, and replace a Π-bundle containing critical paths with one with no critical paths, then even the adversary gets no advantage from critical paths. No violation of the influence specification is essential. Everything that can happen in Π can happen without violating the influence specification. If this is true in Π, we can assume ; when analyzing Π; nothing that matters will be left out.
A sufficient condition for this to hold is that Π's executions be "reparable:"
Definition 17. A path p is ;-critical in B iff first(p) ; last(p). B is ;-reparable iff ; is a may-influence relation for B, and every ;-critical path p has a bridge p(i) → p(i + 1) where msg(p(i)) = a is a basic value.
When ; is understood, we omit it and write "critical" or "reparable." We can assume no bridge term of p is a concatenation by Assumption 3. Thus, when p is reparable, bt(p) is a basic value. In Fig. 3 , the most interesting bridge terms are N 1 and N 2 , which are the uniquely originating values.
Theorem 18 (Separability). For every ;-reparable Π-bundle B, there is a Π-bundle C lying below B such that C obeys ;.
Separability for protocols with session parameters. We will first apply Thm. 18 to the main case of protocols with session parameters, and ; s . The key thing is to show that every critical path is of the first or second kind. The main reason why this is true is that-unless first(p) ; s last(p) and last(p) ; s first(p)-all encryptions at the two ends contain different sets of session parameters. Thus, the bridge terms are basic values.
Theorem 19.
If Π is a protocol with session parameters, then every Π-bundle satisfying Φ s is ; s -reparable. Hence, by Thm. 18, Π obeys ; s subject to Φ s .
If each strand succeeds in choosing its session parameter freshly, then no two instances of the same role are related by the causal order in a reduced bundle, i.e. one obeying ; s . This holds because any two instances supply different values for the session parameter, which are thus incompatible in ; s .
Theorem 20. Suppose that Π is a protocol with session parameters, and B obeys ; s and satisfies Φ s . Then s 1 ↓ i s 2 ↓ j when (i) s 1 = α(ρ) and s 2 = β(ρ); and (ii) P (ρ) is acquired on ρ by step min(i, j).
Protocol Independence
We turn now from our focus on sessions to combining protocols. We organize the results by the choice of may-influence relation.
The discrete may-influence relation. Let Π 1 and Π 2 be protocols, i.e. sets of strands satisfying the assumptions mentioned in 2-3. For simplicity assume that the protocols are disjoint, in the sense that no strand (or initial segment) is an instance of a role of Π 1 and also an instance of a role of Π 2 . Let Π = Π 1 ∪ Π 2 be the protocol that contains all the roles of Π 1 and Π 2 .
Define n 1 ; 1 n 2 to hold for n 1 , n 2 ∈ regnodes(Π) just in case n 1 , n 2 ∈ regnodes(Π 1 ) or n 1 , n 2 ∈ regnodes(Π 2 ). That is, nodes of the two source protocols may not influence each other.
We can use this may-influence relation to infer a protocol independence result,à la [1, 9] . Define Π 1 , Π 2 to have sharply disjoint encryption if 1. every key used for encryption on any node of either is a basic value; and 2. if e 1 is any encryption occurring in Π 1 and e 2 is any encryption occurring in Π 2 , then e 1 and e 2 have no common instance.
The two conditions here are essentially syntactic. Condition 2 says that unification fails for the two encryptions. One way to satisfy condition 2 is using tags. Proof. If p is a critical extended path, then the last bridge p(k) → p(k + 1) on p either precedes a key node-which is a basic value by condition 1-or lies on an direct penetrator path from Π i to Π j . By Lemma 13, then, bt(p) first(p) and bt(p) last(p). Since these have no common encrypted ingredients, bt(p) is thus a basic value. This is the essential idea behind [1, 9] . The clever extension to algebras with convergent subterm rewrite rules in Ciobaca and Cortier's [8] appears to involve related ideas. In our formalism, condition 1 is in fact unnecessary:
Theorem 22. Let Π 1 , Π 2 satisfy Condition 2 of sharply disjoint encryption, and let B be any bundle of Π 1 ∪ Π 2 . There is a bundle C lying below B such that C is ; 1 -reparable. Hence, by Thm. 18, Π 1 ∪ Π 2 obeys ; 1 .
The proof relies on two lemmas. If S is a set of nodes, let enc(S) = { {|t|} K : ∃n ∈ S . {|t|} K msg(n) }, the set of all encryptions occurring anywhere in the messages of S.
Lemma 23. Let B be normal, S, D ⊆ regnodes(B) contain regular nodes, and let n ∈ nodes(B) be any node, such that enc(S) ∩ enc(D ∪ {n}) = ∅, n ∈ S, and bfringe(n) ⊆ S ∪ D. Then, any crossing path p from S to {n} has a bridge p(k) → p(k + 1) where msg(p(k)) is a basic value a, and either 1. a msg(n); or else 2. After step k, there is a decryption strand s on which p joins a direct path q with first(q) ∈ D. Moreover, a K −1 where K is the key in msg(s ↓ 1) = {|t|} K ∈ enc(D).
Proof. Let n be a reception node, since otherwise the claim is vacuous. We work by induction on the ordering . Our induction hypothesis is that the lemma holds for all nodes (whether regular or adversary nodes) n 0 ≺ n such that bfringe(n 0 ) ⊆ S ∪ D for the same S, D.
If p is a direct path, then by Lemma 13, bt(p) first(p) and bt(p) msg(n), and since no encryption occurs in both, bt(p) is a basic value.
Otherwise, there is a key node along p; let p(k + 1) be the last one, i.e. the one with the greatest value of k. Then this key node is the middle node on an encryption or decryption strand m ⇒ p(k + 1) ⇒ p(k + 2).
First, suppose that m ⇒ p(k + 1) ⇒ p(k + 2) is an encryption strand. Since this is constructive and B is normal, p(k + 2), . . . , last(p) consists of constructive strands (encryptions and pairing) only. Thus msg(p(k + 2)) msg(n), and msg(p(k)) msg(n). Hence msg(p(k)) ∈ enc(D ∪ {n}). Applying the induction hypothesis to p(k), path p has the desired bridge no later than p(k).
Next, suppose that m ⇒ p(k + 1) ⇒ p(k + 2) is a decryption strand. By the definition of extended path, m must lie on a direct penetrator path q. The bridge of q must lie after the destructive strand m ⇒ p(k) ⇒ p(k + 1), and hence on the portion shared with p.
If first(q) ∈ S, then by the case for a direct path, bt(q) satisfies the conditions. Otherwise, first(q) ∈ D. If p(k) is a basic value, then condition 2 is satisfied. If p(k) is an encryption t 2 , then msg(m) is of the form {|t 1 |} t2 . By Lemma 13, {|t 1 |} t2 first(q), so that t 2 ∈ enc(D). Thus, the induction hypothesis, applied to p(k), tells us that there is a basic value a = p(i), where i < k, such that either a msg(p(k)), or else a K −1 for some {|t|} K ∈ enc(D). In the first case, a msg(p(k)) = t 2 {|t 1 |} t2 ∈ enc(D), as desired. In the second case, p(i) and a satisfy the desired assertion.
We may now return to the proof of Theorem 22.
Proof. Let p be a critical extended path, say with first(p) ∈ regnodes(Π 1 ) and last(p) ∈ regnodes(Π 2 ). Apply Lemma 23 with S = regnodes(Π 1 )∩bfringe(first(p)) and D = regnodes(Π 2 ) ∩ bfringe(last(p)). Thus, p has a bridge p(k) → p(k + 1) with a basic bridge term msg(p(k)) = a.
We prepare C by breaking the paths for which condition 2 holds for a. If a ∈ unique or if it originates on an adversary strand, we can immediately break the path.
Suppose a ∈ unique and originates on some n 1 ∈ regnodes(Π 1 ). Then by Assumption 2, clause 2, there is a reception node m 0 ⇒ + last(p) such that a msg(m 0 ). Hence, by Lemma 15, there is a direct path q crossing from regnodes(Π 1 ) to regnodes(Π 2 ) such that last(q) m 0 and a bt(q). But since the endpoints have disjoint encryptions, bt(p) = a. Thus, we can connect the bridge of q to p(k + 1).
Suppose a ∈ unique and originates on some n 2 ∈ regnodes(Π 2 ). Then (again via Lemma 15) there is a direct path q crossing from regnodes(Π 2 ) to regnodes(Π 1 ) such that last(q) first(p) and bt(q) = a. Thus, we can connect the bridge of q to p(k + 1).
This shows a pitfall in interpreting strand-based results in the applied pi-calculus. In applied pi, letting w = hash(k 1 , k 2 ), the two protocols P 1 and P 2 :
In strands, by contrast, parameters in individual roles are essentially locally bound, since their possible instances are all substitution instances. Thus, there is no sense in which the two roles share the "same" k 1 , k 2 . Moreover, ν-binding expresses a notion of local choice that is somewhat different from both our unique origination and non-origination. It appears to be that the adversary never originates the ν-bound value. Thus, this result appears to be strong, but not truly comparable to results such as [9] . Another limitation of our result is that it is proved for a particular message algebra, and an adversary model for that, rather than for a class of algebras. We conjecture that there is a substantial class for which the lemmas of § §2, 4 hold, and that our results will hold throughout that class.
A one-way influence relation. Here we consider an asymmetric relation between the protocols Π 1 , Π 2 . Our goal is to ensure that adding the auxiliary protocol cannot undermine the main protocol Π 1 . In many cases, Π 2 consumes cryptographically prepared units such as digital signatures or encrypted tickets (as in Kerberos), for instance, when it resumes sessions created by the main protocol. Thus, the main protocol may influence the auxiliary, but the reverse should not occur [19] . Let Π = Π 1 ∪ Π 2 , and define n 1 ; 2 n 2 to hold for n 1 , n 2 ∈ regnodes(Π) just in case n 1 ∈ regnodes(Π 1 ) or n 2 ∈ regnodes(Π 2 ).
With a more delicate definition of disjoint encryption, and stipulating the condition Φ that no uniquely originating value is contributed by Π 2 , we obtain a properly stronger result. We say that t 0 is a visible ingredient in t 1 , written t 0 v t 1 iff t 1 may be obtained from t 0 by 0 or more pairings. That is, v is the smallest reflexive transitive relation such that t v t , t and t v t , t.
Define Π 1 to have disjoint encryption from Π 2 iff:
1. If {|t|} K originates on any n 2 ∈ regnodes(Π 2 ), then {|t|} K msg(n 1 ), for any n 1 ∈ regnodes(Π 1 ). That is, encryptions created on Π 2 nodes are never accepted on Π 1 nodes. 2. Suppose {|t|} K originates on n 1 ∈ regnodes(Π 1 ), and {|t|} K msg(n 2 ) where n 2 ∈ regnodes(Π 2 ). If t 0 t and t 0 v msg(m 2 ), where n 2 ⇒ + m 2 , then there is an m such that m ⇒ + m 2 and t 0 v msg(m). That is, when Π 2 nodes receive Π 1 encryptions and extract new values from them, they never retransmit those values in visible form.
On these assumptions, the critical paths backward from Π 2 \ Π 1 to Π 1 may involve encryptions, but only if these were already transmitted forward, i.e. they are eliminated by Assumption 2. Similarly for fresh values originating on Π 1 nodes. This key idea in [19] is thus an instance of Thm. 18. There is however, one fine point. We must satisfy the "No open Vs" property of influence functions (Defn. 7, Cause 2), and this does not hold in all bundles. Namely, if a originates uniquely on a node m 2 ∈ regnodes(Π 2 ), and reaches a node m 1 ∈ regnodes(Π 1 ), it is permitted to flow back to a node m 3 ∈ regnodes(Π 2 ). To exclude these bundles, we use a constraint Φ. This constraint singles out the bundles in which no value required to be uniquely originating originates on a node of Π 2 :
a ∈ unique and a originates on n implies n ∈ regnodes(Π 2 ).
(Φ)
Any bundle has a subbundle satisfying this constraint Φ, namely one that omits the offending values from unique. If any security goal of Π 1 has a counterexample, it has a counterexample satisfying Φ; cf. [17] .
Theorem 24. Let Π 1 , Π 2 satisfy disjoint encryption, and let B be any bundle of Π 1 ∪ Π 2 satisfying Φ. There is a bundle C lying below B such that C is ; 2 -reparable. Hence, by Thm. 18, Π 1 ∪ Π 2 obeys ; 2 .
Proof. If p is a critical path, then first(p) ∈ regnodes(Π 2 ) and last(p) ∈ regnodes(Π 1 ). Suppose t v first(p) and t t 1 , where t 1 is an encryption transmitted on a Π 1 node. Then by condition 2, t was received as a visible ingredient on some m ⇒ first(p). Thus, there is a bundle lying below B in which p receives this ingredient directly from some path leading to m.
Otherwise, we may apply Lemma 23 with S = bfringe(last(p)) ∩ regnodes(Π 2 ) and D = bfringe(last(p)) ∩ regnodes(Π 1 ). Condition 1 ensures the disjointness. We infer that there is a basic bridge term a along p. If a msg(last(p)), then p is of the second kind.
Otherwise, a is a decryption key a = K −1 for some {|t|} K ∈ enc(D). If a ∈ unique, or if a originates on an adversary node, then we can immediately break p and connect its bridge to an adversary node.
Otherwise, if a ∈ unique, then by constraint Φ, a originates uniquely on a regular node n 1 ∈ regnodes(Π 1 ). Using Lemma 15, there is a direct path q such that last(q) ∈ regnodes(Π 1 ), last(q) ∈ regnodes(Π 2 ), and last(q) first(p). If bt(q) is an encryption, then we again use condition 2. If bt(q) is the basic value a, then p is again of the first kind. Hence we have a reparable bundle.
We may also use this second form of protocol independence to explain the "sequential composition" of Datta et al. [11] . Here, the nodes of the auxiliary protocol are placed after nodes of the primary protocol, but on the same strands; the formalization is unchanged. In particular, h maps nodes of the primary protocol to π 1 and nodes of the secondary protocol to π 2 . The Clause 1 in Defn. 7 allows this to work when nodes of the secondary protocol never appear before a node of the primary protocol on any strand.
Vertical composition. Suppose that a protocol achieves a goal, assuming that it uses channels that provide particular kinds of protection against the adversary, e.g. that the adversary cannot spoof messages on these channels, or cannot snoop on their contents. Does that yield a secure protocol when these channels are replaced by subprotocols that ensure that the assumptions are met? This is the "vertical composition problem" [14, 16, 27] . Our methods seem highly relevant to this problem, but they require a way to express the channel assumptions as restrictions on the set of relevant bundles. We plan to explore this.
Conclusion.
Two further main areas of future work remain. The more substantial is to adapt this approach to cover a notion of observational equivalence. This appears to involve enriching the adversary model to include a strand that detects the equality of two basic values. We also intend to soften the no V s condition, which is tighter than necessary. For instance, it permits a tuple of messages to be received in a unit, but prohibits these same messages from being received successively, even when there are no intervening transmissions. More careful methods should relax this condition.
